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AN AUDIT by a public accountant culminates in a report or certifi-
cate in which he makes representations as to the scope of the audit and
expresses an opinion concerning the financial statements of his client.
It is the client who engages and pays the accountant to conduct the audit
and render the opinion, and the accountant has no contractual, relations
with anyone other than the client and those who have succeeded to the
client's contractual rights. Nevertheless, as every public accountant real-
izes, the principal, if not the only, value of his professional opinion to the
client resides in its func-
tion of meeting the re-
THE AUTHOR (S.B., 1940, LL.B., 1948, Har- quirements and influenc-
yard) is an Attorney with the United States De- ing the actions of third
partment of Labor. parties with whom the ac-
countant has no contract.
These third parties include
lenders and investors- both present and potential- government agen-
cies, stock exchanges and labor unions.
It is the aim of this article to examine the present state of the law in
this country, both judge-made and statutory, with respect to the right of
a third party (there being no contractual relationship) to recover money
damages from the public accountant when the third party has relied to his
detriment upon the statements of the accountant in the audit report.
There are various other penalties of a legal nature to which a public
accountant may be subjected. He is under certain obligations to his
client, both contractual and otherwise, which are considerably more severe
than any obligations that he may have to third parties, and he may be
sued by the client for failing to fulfill them. He may be suspended from
practice by his state board of accountancy or by some particular govern-
mental agency if he fails to meet standards of professional conduct en-
forced by such board or agency. Certain disciplinary measures may be
taken against him by professional accounting societies. All these respon-
sibilities and penalties are excluded from consideration in this study. Ex-
cluded also is any consideration of the rights of a surety or surety com-
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pany which reimburses the auditor's client, under a fidelity bond, for
defalcations by the client's employees which the auditor has failed to dis-
cover. In such situations the surety is not a true third party, inasmuch as
he merely succeeds to whatever rights the client had against the public
accountant.
NATURE OF THE PROBLEM
In the lands where the common law prevails, the courts have long re-
garded members of the skilled professions as having special responsibili-
ties to the public over and above the specific obligations which they may
assume by contract with the persons who engage them. These special
non-contractual duties are embodied in rules of legal liability which have
crystallized over the years out of innumerable judicial decisions in a wide
variety of factual situations. They have become a part of the common
law of torts.
When a professional man, in the course of his practice, causes harm
to someone other than the person who has engaged his services, the ex-
tent of his legal liability to the injured party is not always dear. This is
so even when the defendant is a member of one of the older professions,
since most of the decided cases have involved injuries to clients rather
than to third parties. The lack of precedent is even more pronounced in
the case of public accountants, whose status as a major professional group
is relatively new. Moreover, the utility of the few decisions that do exist
in this field is limited, as a basis for prediction, by the probability that
each new case which arises will be distinguishable on its facts from all
the cases that have gone before. Nevertheless, the best way to gain an
understanding of the present state of the common law on accountants'
liability to third parties is to study the cases involving this problem in
chronological order, with brief excursions into related cases involving
members of other professions. Moreover, it has been said with reference
to the decisions on accountants' liability that ".. . an intimate knowledge
of the facts and the law of these cases, and their possible implications,
will do more than anything else to develop a technique of imaginative
thinking and alertness in our work and an awareness of the importance
of complying with our own standards."' Consequently, this is the plan
that will be followed here. After the decided cases have been examined,
we will consider the extent to which the common law has been altered
by legislation.
The cases can be better understood if certain concepts are kept in
mind. There are many kinds of torts. Some of them, like assault and
1 Levy, Legal Hazards in Public Accounting, JOURNAL 01 ACCOUNAI CY, May
1955, p. 37, 39.
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battery, involve personal injuries, while others, like trespass and conver-
sion, involve interference with property rights. Viewed as a tort, a false
or misleading certificate by a public accountant comes under the heading
of "misrepresentation." The law recognizes two different categories of
misrepresentation, according to the degree of culpability on the part of
the person who makes them, although the resulting damage may be just
as great in one case as in the other. One of these categories consists of
misrepresentations made fraudulently, while the other consists of those
made negligently. This distinction is very important in the cases on ac-
countants' liability to third parties.
The tort of fraud involves "false representations, willfully or reckless-
ly made for the purpose of tricking or leading another on to his damage."2
Several elements must be present. First, there must be a false representa-
tion. Silence where there is a duty to speak is considered equivalent to
a false representation. Second, the person making the representation must
know or believe that it is false, or be in conscious ignorance of its truth
and must make it with an intent to deceive. Finally, the plaintiff must
have relied on the representation and must have suffered injury thereby.3
The tort of negligence may be defined as failure to use that degree of
care which a person of ordinary carefulness would use under the circum-
stances. Among the "circumstances," of course, would be the defendant's
status as a member of a skilled profession. For example, the making of
a false representation with honest belief in its truth, but with lack of rea-
sonable care in ascertaining the facts or in the manner of expressing the
conclusion, would constitute negligence.4 In view of the constant devel-
opment of auditing standards and techniques and the inevitable factual
differences from case to case, the meaning of "reasonable care" in the
field of auditing cannot be definite or fixed.
THE LANDELL CASE
The first significant court decision in this country on the liability of
public accountants to third parties was Landell v. Lybrand,5 handed down
by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in 1919. The accounting firm
of Lybrand, Ross Brothers and Montgomery had audited the financial
statements of a client corporation for the year 1911 and certified their
accuracy. Landell, the plaintiff, alleged that he had relied on this audit
report in purchasing shares of the client company's stock. He alleged
2 Gross, Responsibility of the Accountant under the Law Explained, JOURNAL OF
COMMERCE AND COMMERCIAL, May 24, 1951.
3 PROssER, TORTs 705-706 (1st ed. 1941).
' PRossER, op. cit. supra note 3, at 733.
"264 Pa. 406, 107 Ad. 783 (1919).
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further that the stock was actually worthless, that the certificate was false
and untrue, and that the negligence of the accounting firm was the cause
of his loss. He conceded, however, that the report had been shown to
him by somebody other than the accounting firm and that it had not been
made with intent to deceive him in particular. The court held that even
if his allegations were all true the plaintiff could recover nothing from
the accountants, for the following reasons:
There were no contractual relations between the plaintiff and defen-
dants, and, if there is any liability from them to him, it must arise out of
some breach of duty, for there is no averment that they made the report
with intent to deceive him. The averment in the statement of claim is that
the defendants were careless and negligent in making their report; but the
plaintiff was a stranger to them and to it, and, as no duty rested upon them
to him, they cannot be guilty of any negligence of which he can complain.'
The Landell case merely applied to public accountants the doctrine al-
ready prevailing in regard to the other skilled professions, namely, that
the negligent making of a misrepresentation does not give rise to legal
liability to third parties. This doctrine was perhaps best exemplified in
the leading English case of LeLievre v. Gould.7 Here a lender agreed to
advance money to a builder on the basis of progress certificates to be sup-
plied from time to time by an architect hired by the builder. The archi-
tect negligently overstated the progress of the building, and the lender was
thereby led to advance funds which it never recovered. The lender sued
the architect, but was dismissed without relief because there was no
"privity of contract" between them. In such a case, said the court, there
could be no recovery even for gross negligence, in the absence of fraud,
notwithstanding the fact that the architect knew that the lender would ad-
vance money to the builder in reliance on the certificates. The court re-
fused to impose strict liability, distinguishing between mere words in a
certificate and a gun or other dangerous instrument. An Ohio case,
Thomas v. Guarantee Title and Trust Co.,8 decided by the Supreme Court
of this state in 1910, was to the same effect. The court held that for mere
negligence in making or certifying an abstract of title, a title abstractor
can be held liable only to the person who employed him.
The rule established by cases such as these is subject to serious crit-
cism, particularly in connection with liability for negligent auditing. The
public accountant intends and expects that his certificate will be exhibited
to third parties and not concealed, and that they will rely on it. He de-
mands and receives payment for it primarily because of the reliance which
'1d. at 408, 107 Ad. at 783.
71 Q.B.D. 491 (1893).
881 Ohio St. 432, 91 N.E. 183 (1910).
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it induces. Under the Landell rule, he is nevertheless insulated from
liability for damages arising out of such riance.9
THE ULTRAMARES CASE
Immediate Background
The most important judicial decision ever handed down on the ques-
tion of accountants' liability to third parties is Ultramares Corp. v.
Touche.'0 It was decided by the New York Court of Appeals in 1931.
The opinion was written by Judge Cardozo, whose contributions in the
field of torts are unsurpassed in the history of the common law."1 The
great learning and facility of expression which Cardozo brought to the
Ultramares case make it a storehouse of persuasive and quotable pro-
nouncements, and perhaps it is partly because of this that the common
law on accountants' liability has remained substantially unchanged ever
since.12
Before going into the details of the Ultramares case, it would be well
to take note of Glanzer v. Shepard,13 an earlier New York case in which
Cardozo also wrote the opinion. In that case a seller of beans engaged
a public weigher to issue a weight certificate in duplicate and to present
one copy to a designated buyer. The weigher's admitted negligence re-
sulted in a false certificate, and the buyer, relying on this certificate, paid
for the quantity of beans indicated on it. The buyer sued the weigher
and was allowed to recover damages from him despite the absence of con-
tractual relations between them. This, of course, represented a departure
from the rule theretofore prevailing, but Cardozo sought to overcome the
lack of "privity" with the following argument:
The defendants, acting, not casually nor as mere servants, but in the
pursuit of an independent calling, weighed and certified at the order of
one with the very end and aim of shaping the conduct of another. Dili-
gence was owing, not only to him who ordered, but to him also who
relied.'
It was only natural, therefore, that there was much consternation in ac-
counting cirdes when the Ultramares case came before Judge Cardozo,
and that the American Institute of Accountants, represented by three at-
torneys, came into the case and presented arguments as amicus curiae.
9PRossER, op. cit. supra note 25, at 738.
10255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
Seavey, Mr. Justice Cardozo and the Law of Torts, 52 HARv. L. REV. 372 (1939).
"aThe holding was generally approved at the time. Seavey, op. cit. supra note 11, at
398.
- 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922).
"Id. at 242, 135 N.E. at 277.
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The Facts in the Case
The plaintiff in the Ultramares case was a lending institution which
had made a series of loans to Fred Stern and Company, a corporation
which imported and sold rubber. The defendants were the members of
Touche, Niven and Company, an accounting firm engaged by Stern early
in 1924 to prepare and certify a balance sheet showing the condition of
the business as of December 31, 1923. The defendants had been simi-
larly employed by Stern and Company for the three preceding years, and
they knew that in the normal course of its operations it borrowed large
sums of money and showed its certified balance sheets to banks, creditors,
stockholders and others, as the occasion demanded. Accordingly, when
the balance sheet was made up, they supplied Stern and Company with
thirty-two copies, certified with serial numbers as counterpart originals.
Prior to that time, however, the Stern Company had never borrowed from
the Ultramares Corporation, and the accountants did not know that the
balance sheet would be exhibited to this particular lender. As Cardozo
said, "The range of the transaction in which a certificate of audit might
be expected to play a part was as indefinite and wide as the possibilities
of the business."'15 Here, it developed, was an important difference be-
tween this case and Glanzer v. Shepard.16
By the end of February, 1924, the audit was finished and the balance
sheet was made up. Attached to it was this certificate signed by the
defendants:
We have examined the accounts of Fred Stern & Co., Inc., for the year
ending December 31, 1923, and hereby certify that the annexed balance
sheet is in accordance therewith and with the information and explanations
given us. We further certify that, subject to provision for federal taxes on
income, the said statement, in our opinion, presents a true and correct
view of the financial condition of Fred Stern & Co., Inc., as at December
31, 1923.17
The certified balance sheet showed a net worth of some $1,071,000.
As a matter of actual fact, the company was insolvent on December 31,
1923, although it was not declared a bankrupt until 1925. Stern and his
subordinates, as officers of the firm, had falsified the books so as to set
forth accounts receivable and other assets which were wholly fictitious
and to omit accounts payable for merchandise which had been purchased
and received. During 1924 Stern and Company requested and obtained
a series of large loans from the plaintiff, including a loan of $165,000 in
one month alone. As a condition of these loans the plaintiff demanded
- 255 N.Y. 170, 174, 174 N.E. 441, 442 (1931).
18233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922).
17255 N.Y. 170, 174, 174 N.E. 441, 442 (1931).
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a balance sheet certified by public accountants, and Stern submitted one
of the thirty-two counterpart originals certified by the defendants.
In 1926 the plaintiff sued the defendants to recover the loss of more
than $187,000 which it had suffered by relying upon the audit certificate.
The plaintiff alleged that both parts of the certificate contained misrepre-
sentations, first where the accountants certified that to their own knowledge
the balance sheet corresponded to the accounts, and second where they
certified to a belief that the balance sheet presented a true and correct
picture of the client's financial condition. The theory of the plaintiff's
case was that the first sentence of the certificate, being a statement of
fact, constituted fraud, while the second sentence, being an erroneous
statement of opinion by persons in the business of expressing such opin-
ions, constituted negligence.
Negligence
The court first held that the evidence adequately supported the find-
ing of the jury that the audit had been negligently made. For instance,
one Siess, a junior accountant, was assigned by the defendants to post the
general ledger from the entries in the journal, which the client itself had
not done since April, 1923. After this posting was finished on February
3, 1924, the total of the accounts receivable on December 31 appeared on
the ledger as about $645,000. At some later hour on February 3, Stern's
chief bookkeeper, one Romberg, placed below that total a further item
of about $707,000, supposed to represent additional sales made by Stern
in December, all of which were wholly fictitious. Opposite this entry
Romberg placed other figures, such as "12-29," ostensibly indicating ref-
erences to the journal for December. When Siess resumed his labors the
next day, he noticed these entries in Romberg's handwriting, but since his
job was merely to post the books, he included the new item in making up
his footings. There never was any verification of the $707,000 ledger
entry, either by Siess or by his superiors. In fact, it was not supported
by any entries in the journal or in the "debit memo book" from which
the journal was made up, and although there were seventeen invoices
amounting in the aggregate to the $707,000, they differed in credit terms
and otherwise from those usual in the business and they contained no
shipping numbers or order numbers. According to the court, all these
suspicious circumstances would have been revealed if an adequate verifi-
cation had been attempted.
Other instances of negligence in the conduct of the audit were also
mentioned by the court. Stern had given the auditors an inventory figure
of some $347,000, but in checking this they discovered errors of some
$304,000 and reduced the inventory figure to only $43,000. Furthermore,
19561
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they made inquiries of various creditors and discovered that the same ac-
counts receivable had been pledged to three or four different banks at
the same time. Such circumstances as these, according to the court, threw
such discredit upon the business and the books that reasonable and pru-
dent auditors in the exercise of due care, would press their investigations
much further than was done here, where the defendants were satisfied
with weak explanations by Romberg.
Liability to Third Parties for Negligence
After ruling that it was entirely proper for a jury to find the account-
ing firm guilty of negligence, the court went on to consider whether this
particular plaintiff, as a third party having no contract with the defend-
ants, could recover damages for such negligence, as the third party plain-
tiff had succeeded in doing in Glanzer v. Shepard.1" Cardozo outlined
the problem as follows:
The assault upon the citadel of privity is proceeding in these days
apace. How far the inroads shall extend is now a favorite subject of ju-
ridical discussion.... In the field of the law of torts a manufacturer who
is negligent in the manufacture of a chattel in circumstances pointing to an
unreasonable risk of serious bodily harm to those using it thereafter may
be liable for negligence though privity is lacking between manufacturer
and user.... A force or instrument of harm having been launched with
potentialities of danger manifest to the eye of prudence, the one who
launches it is under a duty to keep it within bounds.... Even so, the ques-
tion is still open whether the potentialities of danger that will charge with
liability are confined to harm to the person, or include injury to property.
... In either view, however, what is released or set in motion is a physical
force. We are now asked to say that a like liability attaches to the circula-
tion of a thought or a release of the explosive power resident in words."
The eloquent judge proceeded to point out that in the Glanzer case,
unlike the present one:
... the transmission of the certificate to another was not merely one
possibility among many, but the "end and aim of the transaction," as cer-
tain and immediate and deliberately willed as if a husband were to order a
gown to be delivered to his wife.... The bond was so close as to approach
that of privity, if not completely one with it.... In a word, the service ren-
dered by the defendant in Glanzer v. Shepard was primarily for the infor-
mation of a third person, in effect, if not in name, a party to the contract,
and only incidentally for that of the formal promisee. In the case at hand,
the service was primarily for the benefit of the Stern company, a conven-
ient instrumentality for use in the development of the business, and only
incidentally or collaterally for the use of those to whom Stern and his as-
sociates might exhibit it thereafter."
- 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922).
-255 N.Y. 170, 180, 174 NE. 441,445 (1931).
2* Ibid.
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Whatever one may think of the validity of this distinction, which at least
one admirer of Cardozo has called a distinction without a difference,21
Cardozo was also impressed, perhaps unduly, by certain practical consider-
ations, as the following language shows:
If liability for negligence exists, a thoughtless slip or blunder, the fail-
ure to detect a theft or forgery beneath the cover of deceptive entries, may
expose accountants to a liability in an indeterminate amount for an inde-
terminate time to an indeterminate class. The hazards of a business con-
ducted on these terms are so extreme as to enkindle doubt whether a flaw
may not exist in the implication of a duty that exposes to these conse-
quences
Liability for negligence if adjudged in this case will extend to many
callings other than an auditor's. Lawyers who certify their opinion as to
the validity of municipal or corporate bonds, with knowledge that the
opinion will be brought to the notice of the public, will become liable to
the investors, if they have overlooked a statute or a decision, to the same
extent as if the controversy were one between client and adviser. Title
companies insuring titles to a tract of land, with knowledge that at an ap-
proaching auction the fact that they have insured will be stated to the
bidders, will become liable to purchasers who may wish the benefit of a
policy without payment of a premium.n
Finally, Cardozo brought this phase of the court's holding to an end by
stating that negligence would become a substitute for fraud if the de-
fendants were held liable to this plaintiff for their negligent auditing, and
that,
The suitors thrown out of court because they proved negligence, and
nothing else, in an action for deceit, might have ridden to triumphant
victory if they had proved the self-same facts, but had given the wrong
another label.... A word of caution or suggestion would have set the err-
ing suitor right. Many pages of opinion were written by judges the most
eminent, yet the word was never spoken. We may not speak it now. A
change so revolutionary, if expedient, must be wrought by legislation.'
Fraud
It was too early, however, for Touche, Niven and Company and the
American Institute of Accountants to breathe a sigh of relief. Although
the accountants had escaped liability to the plaintiff for mere negligence,
the court still had to consider the plaintiff's allegations of fraud. In re-
gard to liability for fraud in general, it could be said that by 1930
*.. the privilege of one bargaining party to cheat another had gradu-
ally been narrowed; the field of permissible sellers' lies had been made
smaller... In most states it was no longer a defense that the plaintiff was
' Seavey, op. cit. supra note 11, at 400.
-255 N.Y. 170, 179, 174 N.E. 441, 444 (1931).
'Id. at 188, 174 N.E. at 448.
-1Id. at 186, 174 NE. at 447.
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a fool. But by and large, there had been no corresponding extension of
liability to third persons'
As the court's opinion in the Ultramares case pointed out, however, it
was established law in New York that where a person makes a certificate
for his client or employer with knowledge that the client or employer will
show it to prospective creditors and investors, the person making the
certificate owes a duty to such third parties to make it without fraud.
Moreover, in the words of Cardozo, "fraud includes the pretense of knowl-
edge when knowledge there is none."2 6 Here the defendants certified as
a fact, true to their own knowledge, that the balance sheet was in accord-
ance with the books of account. Even if they had expressed this conclu-
sion as a mere opinion rather than as a fact, however, the following state-
ment by Cardozo indicates that they could have still been found guilty of
fraud:
Even an opinion, especially an opinion by an expert, may be found to
be fraudulent if the grounds supporting it are so flimsy as to lead to the
conclusion that there was no genuine belief back of it.'
Cardozo ruled that on the evidence produced in court the jury might well
have found that the balance sheet did not correspond with the books and
that the defendants actually had no knowledge on the subject.28
The defendants admitted that if they had looked at the seventeen in-
voices representing the fictitious ledger entry of $707,000, they would
have found omissions and irregularities so many and unusual as to have
called for further investigation, but they contended that by following a
random testing and sampling procedure in examining accounts and the
related invoices, they had done all that could reasonably be expected of
them, even though none of the seventeen fictitious invoices, which repre-
sented over half of the total value of accounts receivable shown in the
ledger, was among the 200 invoices actually examined. According to the
court, however, verification by test and sample was "plainly insufficient
... where inspection of the invoices was necessary, not as a check upon
' Seavey, op. cit. supra note 11, at 402.
-255 N.Y. 170, 179, 174 N.E. 441,444 (1931).
Id. at 186, 174 N.E. at 447.
' Id. at 192, 174 N.E. at 448.
"Correspondence between the balance sheet and the books imports something
more, or so the triers of fact might say, than correspondence between the balance
sheet and the general ledger, unsupported or even contradicted by every other record.
The correspondence to be of any moment may not unreasonably be held to signify
a correspondence between the statement and the books of original entry, the books
taken as a whole. If that is what the certificate means, a jury could find that the
correspondence did not exist and that the defendants signed the certificates without
knowing it to exist and even without reasonable grounds for belief in its existence."
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accounts fair upon their face, but in order to ascertain whether there were
any accounts at al." 29
By way of strengthening his conclusion that a jury could find the de-
fendants liable to the plaintiff under the fraud theory, Cardozo invoked
the principle that:
... negligence or blindness, even when not equivalent to fraud, is none
the less evidence to sustain an inference of fraud. At least this is so if the
negligence is gross.'
The Court of Appeals, therefore, disposed of the case by affirming
the judgment of the trial court, which had been rendered notwithstanding
a jury verdict to the contrary, in favor of the accountants on the question
of liability for negligence, but reversing the judgments of the lower courts
in favor of the accountants on the question of fraud, and granting a new
trial on the fraud issue. The effect of this decision was well summarized
by the court itself as follows:
Our holding does not emancipate accountants from the consequences
of fraud. It does not relieve them if their audit has been so negligent as to
justify a finding that they had no genuine belief in its adequacy, for this
again is fraud. It does no more than say that if less than this is proved, if
there has been neither reckless misstatement nor insincere profession of an
opinion, but only honest blunder, the ensuing liability for negligence is one
that is bounded by the contract, and is to be enforced between the parties
by whom the contract has been made. We doubt whether the average
businessman receiving a certificate without paying for it, and receiving
it merely as one among a multitude of possible investors, would look for
anything more.'
THE BEARDSLEY CASE
While the case of Beardsley v. Ernst"2 does not rank with the Ultra-
mares case as a landmark of legal development, it is of interest to Ohio
accountants and lawyers, and particularly to those in the Cleveland area,
because it was decided by the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County in
"Id. at 192, 174 N.E. at 449. On this point Cardozo made the following additional
comments: "How far books of account fair upon their face are to be probed by ac-
countants, in an effort to ascertain whether the transactions back of them are in ac-
cordance with the entries, involves to some extent the exercise of judgment and
discretion. Not so, however, the inquiry whether the entries certified as there are
there in very truth, there in the form and in the places where men of business train-
ing would expect them to be. The defendants were put on their guard by the cir-
cumstances touching the December accounts receivable to scrutinize with special care.
A jury might find that with suspicions thus awakened, they closed their eyes to the
obvious, and blindly gave assent."
20 Ibid.
" 255 N.Y. 170, 189, 174 N.E. 441, 448 (1931).
"47 Ohio App. 241, 191 N.E. 808 (1934).
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1934 and involved the accounting firm of Ernst and Ernst as the de-
fendant.
Ernst and Ernst had certified the consolidated balance sheets and the
consolidated income and surplus accounts of the International Match
Corporation, headed by the Swedish match king, Ivar Krueger, for the
years 1929 and 1930. The certified statements showed net income in
excess of $20,000,000 each year, but it later developed that the true fig-
ures were in the vicinity of $8,000,000.
During 1931 the plaintiff, Martha R. Beardsley, allegedly in reliance
upon the audit certificate, bought stocks and bonds of the International
Match Corporation. In 1932 Mr. Krueger committed suicide, and it be-
came known that the corporation was bankrupt and its stocks and bonds
worthless. The plaintiff sued Ernst and Ernst for $2,340 (the amount
of her loss) on the theory that they had been guilty of fraud within the
meaning of the Ultramares case, by purporting to have knowledge of the
facts when in truth they had no such knowledge.
The Ohio court indicated that it would follow the Ultramares case and
permit third parties to recover from public accountants on the ground of
fraud where the accountants certify that the balance sheet reflects the true
condition of the books when in fact it does not, and the certification is
either made knowingly or involves a pretense of knowledge when in fact
there was no knowledge. In the present case, however, Ernst and Ernst
had dearly stated in their certificates that it was based both upon an ex-
amination of the records and upon statements received from abroad with
respect to the foreign companies constituting a part of the consolidated
entity. This, according to the court, gave rise to an indisputable inference
that the accountants had not examined the books and records of the for-
eign constituent companies and obviously did not know, or pretend to
know, whether or not the information from abroad was accurate. There-
fore, since no fraud was proved in relation to the examination actually
made of the books and records in this country, the court held that Ernst
and Ernst had not committed fraud and were not liable to the plaintiff.
The obvious moral of the Beardsley case is that public accountants
should be very careful to make the report or certificate reveal the limita-
tions of the audit actually performed.
THE O'CONNOR CASE
The next reported case on the liability of public accountants to third
parties was O'Connor v. Ludlam,33 decided in 1937 by a federal court of
appeals. The defendants were the members of the accounting firm of
'92 F.2d 50 (2nd Cir. 1937) cert. denied, 302 U.S. 758 (1937).
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Haskins and Sells, which had audited the books of a client, G. L. Miller
and Company, as of August 31, 1925, and had prepared and delivered to
the client corporation a balance sheet purporting to show its financial
position as of that date after giving effect to a proposed sale of 30,000
shares of preferred stock at par for $3,000,000. The defendants knew
that the Miller company was going to use this balance sheet in selling
the preferred stock to the public. The balance sheet, together with the
following statement, appeared over the signature of the accounting firm:
Our audit of the books and accounts of the G. L. Miller Company,
Incorporated, discloses that the net earnings of the Company for the year
ended December 31, 1924, were in excess of 2V2 times the dividend re-
quirements of the contemplated issue of 30,000 shares of 8% cumulative
preferred stock, and that the net earnings for the eight months ended
August 31, 1925, were in excess of 3 times the dividend requirements of
said stock for the said eight months.'
In fact, the Miller company was adjudged bankrupt in 1926.
The plaintiffs were preferred shareholders who, in alleged reliance up-
on the certificate of Haskins and Sells, purchased stock in the Miller com-
pany after the audit report was made and before the adjudication of bank-
ruptcy. Here, as in the Beardsley case, the plaintiffs alleged that the bal-
ance sheet was false and that the accounting firm had committed fraud
in representing it to be true. The defendants testified at great length as
to the auditing procedures which they had followed and offered evidence
supporting their representations. There was much testimony by experts
for both sides. The court noted with chagrin that it had to consider more
than 4,000 printed pages of recorded testimony and several hundred docu-
mentary exhibits, consisting mainly of the defendants' working papers.
At the trial, which lasted thirteen weeks, it was brought out that there
were five principal defects, or alleged defects, in the balance sheet and
the accompanying statement by the auditors.
First, the balance sheet showed cash of some $4,664,000, but did not
adequately reveal that some $1,377,000 of this was held by the company
in trust for certain bondholders and not owned outright. The defendants
contended that this was adequately disclosed to ordinary readers by an
item of some $1,967,000 under the heading of "Funds for Bond Interest
and Redemption" on the liability side of the balance sheet.
Second, the balance sheet showed notes and accounts receivable of
some $2,987,000 as secured, when as a matter of law they were not
secured. The defendants argued that they honestly, even if erroneously,
believed them to be secured, and they cited certain provisions in the
relevant documents which gave some plausibility to this contention. They
"Id. at 53.
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further argued that a statement by an auditor that notes are secured is a
mere expression of opinion rather than an assertion of knowledge, and in
dealing with legal documents, an accountant can be guilty only of negli-
gence, and not of fraud, where he honestly misconceives the legal signifi-
cance of certain provisions in such documents.
Third, many of these notes receivable were the notes of subsidiaries
or affiliates of the client company, but the balance sheet did not reveal
this. There was conflicting expert testimony as to whether or not this
was in conformity with good accounting practice.
Fourth, the balance sheet contained no mention of millions of dollars
of contingent liabilities which, on the basis of prior experience of Miller
and Company, were not at all unlikely to become actual liabilities. Here
again there was conflicting expert testimony as to whether good account-
ing practice required disclosure of these contingent liabilities.
Fifth, the certificate of Haskins and Sells as to the net earnings of
Miller and Company was apparently false.
After the trial judge had explained the law to the jury on the basis of
the Ultramares case, the jury decided that the public accountants had not
committed fraud despite the flaws in the balance sheet and the certificate.
The plaintiffs appealed on the ground that the jury should have been
given certain additional instructions the effect of which would have been
to stretch the label of "fraud" over a wider range of acts and omissions.
The court of appeals affirmed the judgment for Haskins and Sells, though
not in a manner which justified any great rejoicing in the accounting pro-
fession, as the following language from the opinion shows:
In conclusion, we may say that the trial was entirely fair to the ap-
pellants. A dear and accurate charge was delivered under which the jury
might well have found a verdict for the plaintiffs. There was much in the
evidence which tended to cast doubt upon the good faith of the account-
ants, but it did not persuade the jury. An appellate court cannot set at
naught a jury's verdict merely because they might have reached a different
conclusion had they been sitting as the jury. Finding no error in the charge
as given and nothing clearly wrong in refusing requested instructions, we
affirm the judgment.'
THE STATE STREET TRUST COMPANY CASE
Cardozo was no longer on the New York Court of Appeals in 1938,
but the case of State Street Trust Co. v. Ernst,"6 decided by that court in
that year, ranks second only to the Ultramares case itself as a guidepost
to the common law on the liability of public accountants to third parties.
It is the last major reported judicial decision on that issue. It purports
'Id. at 56.
- 278 N.Y. 104, 15 N.E.2d 416 (1938).
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to be an application and interpretation of the Ultramares case, from which
both sides sought to derive support. The plaintiff was one of several
banks which had made loans to the Pelz-Greenstein Company during the
year 1929 in reliance upon the financial statements of that company for
the year 1928. The defendants were the members of Ernst and Ernst,
the accounting firm which had audited and certified these statements. The
plaintiff contended that Ernst and Ernst had committed negligence so
gross as to justfy an inference of fraud. Pelz-Greenstein was petitioned
into bankruptcy in 1930, and the plaintiff received back only a portion of
its loan. The damages sought from Ernst and Ernst were equal to the
difference. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, but the trial
judge set it aside and rendered a judgment in favor of the accountants,
despite the fact that they had chosen to rest their case strictly on the law
and not to offer any evidence or call any witnesses of their own. The
issue before the court of appeals, therefore, was whether the plaintiff's
evidence was, as the defendants contended, so inadequate that it could not
possibly support a jury finding that they were guilty of gross negligence
raising an inference of fraud.
The Pelz-Greenstein Company was engaged in the factoring business.
They loaned money to wholesalers or mills and took, as security, pledges
of the inventories and assignments of the future accounts receivable of
the borrowers. Pelz-Greenstein obtained most of its own working capi-
tal by borrowing from banks. Early in 1929 Pelz-Greenstein applied to
the plaintiff for a loan of $300,000, but the plaintiff refused to grant a
time loan until it had received a certified balance sheet. On April 2,
1929, the defendants issued to Pelz-Greenstein ten counterparts with full
knowledge that the counterparts were to be used in obtaining credit. This
balance sheet showed a surplus of $83,000, when in fact, according to the
plaintiff's uncontradicted evidence, there was a deficit of more than $500,-
000 and, further, an obvious liklihood of substantial losses on more than
$768,000 of uncollected accounts receivable. On April 9, Pelz-Green-
stein presented one of the counterparts to the plaintiff and the loan was
made. Attached to each counterpart was the following certificate:
We hereby certify that we examined the books of account and record
pertaining to the assets of Pelz-Greenstein Co., Inc., New York City, as of
the dose of business December 31, 1928, and, based on the records ex-
amined, information submitted to us, and subject to the foregoing notes
[not here material], it is our opinion that the above condensed statement
shows the financial condition of the company at the date stated and that
the related income and surplus account is correctY (Bracket matter in-
serted by court).
On May 9, one month after submitting the ten counterparts of the
WId. at 110, 15 N.E.2d at 418.
19561
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
"condensed statement" or "shortform report," Ernst and Ernst sent to
Pelz-Greenstein a "letter of explanation" or "long-form report" containing
the following statement: "This balance sheet is subject to the comments
contained in the letter attached to and made a part of this report.38 The
letter also pointed out facts known to Ernst and Ernst at the time of pre-
paring their certificate but not mentioned in the certified balance sheet.
Only one copy of this letter was sent, and it did not come to the attenion
of the plaintiff or anyone else until after the bankruptcy of Pelz-Green-
stein.
The court of appeals, in a four to two decision, held against the ac-
countants and granted the plaintiff a new trial, on the ground that the
evidence did not justify the trial judge's holding that as a matter of law
the plaintiff had failed to make out a case against the defendants even if
all of the uncontradicted evidence introduced by the plaintiff was true.
In support of its decision the court pointed out a number of acts and
omissions by the defendants which could be found by a jury to constitute
gross negligence raising an inference of fraud.
First, according to the court, the very act of sending ten copies of the
short-form report to Pelz-Greenstein, knowing that this report would be
used to obtain credit, though it did not reveal the qualifying circum-
stances known to the auditors at the time and mentioned by them a month
later in the long-form report, could be found to be gross negligence
equivalent to active misrepresentation.
Second, over one-fourth of Pelz-Greenstein's assets were represented
by an account called "Commission Accounts Receivable -Secured by
Merchandise." This account showed a balance of over $2,000,000 with
an offsetting allowance for bad debts of only $20,000. But the account-
ants knew, as their long-form report showed, that 38% of the $2,000,000,
representing the accounts of 27 of the 55 borrowers from Pelz-Green-
stein, consisted of unpaid advances equal to 125% of the total sales of
these 27 borrowers during 1928, thus indicating a stagnation of inven-
tories and a high probability of substantial losses by Pelz-Greenstein.
Moreover, the defendants had also audited the books of Pelz-Greenstein
for the two previous years, and they themselves had pointed out similar
factors in those years. According to the uncontradicted testimony of the
plaintiff's expert witnesses, proper accounting practice required that the
defendants either establish a very large reserve for bad debts or reveal
that $768,000 of the accounts receivable had a 125% ratio of advances
to sales. Furthermore, the defendants knew that these and other non-pay-
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Third, an account called "Commission Account Balances -Inactive
and in Liquidation" appeared on the balance sheet as an asset without any
offsetting valuation reserve, although the plaintiff's experts testified that
there should have been a reserve of at least $150,000 against these ac-
counts. The defendants did place this item below the current asset sec-
tion of the balance sheet, but the experts further testified that this in no
way disclosed the probable noncollectibility of the account balances. The
defendants knew (indeed, they noted it in their subsequent long-form re-
port) that many of the accounts included in this item had lain dormant
for years, with no collections or realizations upon security, but had never-
theless been regularly inflated over the years by steadily increasing inter-
est charges. In one case, all this was done even though it appeared on
the face of the books that the borrower was in bankruptcy. Ernst and
Ernst argued that they were excused from investigating these accounts be-
cause Pelz-Greenstein's treasurer informed them by letter that the com-
pany had enough security in its possession to liquidate the accounts com-
pletely, but this statement was unsupported and uninvestigated. The
plaintiff's experts testified that in such circumstances, proper accounting
practice would require a thorough independent investigation as to what
security, if any, Pelz-Greenstein held for the payment of these accounts.
Fourth, in an account called merely "Accounts Receivable," there was
a balance of some $3,200,000, including over $32,000 of accounts desig-
nated as bankrupt on the defendants' working papers and not covered by
credit insurance, plus some $14,000 of insured bankrupt accounts which
had been in the hands of the insurance company for fifteen months or
more without action. Yet the reserve for bad debts which had been set
up against the entire $3,200,000 amounted to only $15,000. Failure to
set up a reserve of at least $46,000 was, to the court, an obvious instance
of gross negligence.
Fifth, a $10,000 demand note was listed as an asset without any off-
setting reserve, although for two years it had been in the hands of an at-
torney for collection.
Sixth, a borrower whose account constituted over $800,000 of the as-
sets of Pelz-Greenstein had monthly sales averaging about $129,000 and
never exceeding $191,000 during the first eleven months of 1928, but its
sales for December were shown on the books as having jumped to $491,-
000. It later developed that this included over $300,000 of wholly fic-
titious sales, and the very size of the December figure, according to the
experts, should have led the defendants to make an investigation.
Seventh, there was evidence that certain allowances for "discounts"
and "doubtfuls" shown against accounts receivable on the certified bal-
ance sheet had been arrived at by accepting the figures used in 1927
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rather than on the basis of 1928 sales. Moreover, the 1927 allowances
had been arbitrarily reduced from the amounts computed by usual ac-
counting practices to much lower amounts, so as to show a 1927 profit
in excess of the 1927 dividends.
After pointing out these instances of what a jury might properly find
to be gross negligence raising an inference of fraud, the court went on to
discuss the element of reliance, which is necessary for a recovery of dam-
ages on the basis either of negligence or of fraud. The defendants argued
that the plaintiff had relied more on the reputation of Pelz-Greenstein
than on the audit certificate, but the court said:
It is undoubtedly true that, in making the loan, there was reliance upon
the then reputations of Pelz and Greenstein. But this does not preclude
reliance also upon defendants' certified balance sheet .... The fraudulent
misrepresentations on the part of defendants need not be the sole inducing
cause of the damage.'
COMMON-LAW LIABILITY TO THIRD PARTIBS TODAY
In general terms, the common law today, as laid down in the Ultramares
case and amplified in the State Street Trust Company case, can be sum-
marized by stating that the public accountant is liable to third parties for
fraud and is not liable to third parties for negligence. And if a jury finds
that the negligence was gross, it may properly infer fraud from the existence
of negligence. The cases discussed above give an idea of how these rules
are likely to be applied in practice. It would seem that for practical purposes
-these cases have eliminated any distinction between fraud and negligence,
for under the rules which they have established, a jury can "take care of the
equities in the situation"40 if the accountants have been guilty of seriously
wrongful conduct. According to one writer, the effect of the State Street
Trust Company case, as an extension of the Ultramares rule, is that 'The
curtains which failed to exclude the nose of the camel are now further parted
to admit the head." 41
This is in line with the modern trend in the decisions with regard to the
liability of members of other skilled professions to third parties who may
be expected to rely upon their words. 42 But the situation of public ac-
countants is more perilous than that of most other professional makers of
representations, in view of the unforeseeable extent of possible reliance by
unknown third parties. It is mainly this consideration that led to anguished
editorial cries in the Journal of Accountancy in 1950. In that year a series
'Id. at 122, 15 N.E.2d at 423.
'° Seavey, op. cit. supra note 11, at 404.
"bid.
'Seavey, op. cit. supra note 11, at 400.
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of related suits, apparently not yet finally deqided, were filed by certain
lending institutions against the accounting firm which had audited the
books of a bankrupt borrower.43 On the basis of these editorials, it seems
that the only "solution" that would satisfy the accounting profession would
be the abolition of the doctrine which permits juries to infer fraud from
negligence if the negligence is gross. The writer of one editorial mentioned
"the specter of unlimited liability which haunts public-accounting practi-
tioners" and complained that the Ultramares case was "novel judicial doc-
trine" and "opened up new problems which are no nearer solution now than
they were in 193 1.44 The footnote contains representative excerpts from
these editorials.
'3JOtURNAL OF AccouNTANcy, April 1950, p. 277; September 1950, p. 187.
One of these cases was recently heard in a federal court of appeals. C.I.T. Fi-
nancial Corporation v. P.W.R. Glover, 224 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1955). The court
of appeals upheld a jury verdict for the accountants on the ground that "we do
not believe we should attempt to go beyond the standards of the market place, as re-
flected in current judicial decisions." The court stated that it was inclined to agree
with the trial judge's charge to the jury to the effect that in order to establish a duty
on the part of the accountants to the third-party plaintiff for ordinary negligence, the
plaintiff would have to convince the jury that the audit reports had been made for
the "primary benefit" of the plaintiff, and cited the Ultramares and O'Connor cases
on this point. Regardless of the correctness of this charge, however, the court indi-
cated that the jury's verdict should stand because the jury had found that the defen-
dants' representations had not been negligently false or misleading, so the charge
could not have affected the outcome of the case.
The case is discussed at some length in Levy, The C.LT. Case, JOURNAL OF Ac-
COUNTANcY, October 1955, p. 31.
"JOURNAL OF ACCouNTANCY, April 1950, p. 277.
'" he catastrophic possibilities of unfavorable findings under this doctrine, in ad-
dition to the unfavorable publicity arising out of litigation, have impelled account-
ants to settle the relatively infrequent negligence suits out of court. As a result, we
know of no case which has been fully tried on its merits through the highest courts.
Consequently the line between negligence and fraud, in relation to the liability of
auditors, remains obscure."
"By being organized as partnerships rather than in corporate form, they [public
accountants) expose their personal fortunes to these responsibilities." "If they were to
aasume unlimited liabilities to 'third parties,' it would be necessary for accountants
either to charge premiums as insurers or to stop expressing expert opinions on finan-
cial statements. Either course would seriously retard the machinery of credit and
investment."
'The knowledge that many accounting firms carry liability insurance may tempt
those who have suffered losses to try to recover from the accountants." "What is
needed is the assurance that would be afforded by a reasonable judicial interpretation
of the distinction between negligence and fraud, as these terms are applied to the
duties of auditors. Until we have it, accountants may be plagued by strike suits and
may be virtually blackmailed into settlements of unjust claims. The mere initiation
of the suit is a shocking warning of the hazards to which professional accountants
may be exposed. In the absence of willful fraud or connivance on the part of account-
ants, which so far as we know is not alleged in this case, it seems beyond the realm of
common sense that any professional practitioner should be subjected to such ruinous
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A more moderate tone was taken in an article which appeared in the
New York Certified Public Accountant in 1949.4 ' As the author of that
article pointed out:
The law of auditors' liability is still in the early stages of its growth.
Its scope and limit... are necessarily uncertain and not fully defined...
a changing commercial society has been altering earlier concepts and
standards.... In such a new and relatively unexplored area, the courts and
the profession are feeling their way and being guided perhaps more by
changing conditions than by either judicial or accounting precedent."
The writer was troubled by the fact that fraud could be established without
evidence of deliberation, premeditation, scheming, or bad intentions of any
kind, and he spoke of "the distressing uncertainty of what an average jury,
without technical knowledge or accounting experience, may do with the
evidence presented to it in terms of negligence, gross negligence, and of a
rather special type of fraud,"47 but he concluded that:
Professional standards and practices are crystallizing in a pattern of
greater uniformity and receiving more wide-spread acceptance. Coupled
with the current trend in all areas of commercial and professional endeavor
to a stricter legal as well as social responsibility, one may, therefore, rea-
sonably expect that the law's future development will stress an extension
and refinement of the accountant's responsibility to the public he serves.'
Although complaining loud and long about the judicial decisions against
them, the certified public accountants of this country, as the preceding
quotation suggests, have been doing much to decrease the likelihood of
lawsuits by improving their own auditing standards and procedures. In
fact, it might well be concluded that the accounting profession itself recog-
nizes ethical responsibilities to third parties which are greater than the
legal liabilities imposed by the courts, if certain excerpts from the Codifica-
tion of Statements on Auditing Procedure, issued by the American Institute
of Accountants in 1951, are any criterion.49
liabilities. The amount of damages claimed appears fantastic in relation to what
the fees paid to the accountants could have been."
"Kostelanetz, Auditors' Responsibilities and the Law, 19 NEw YORK CERTIFIED
PUBLIC ACCOUNTANT 91 (Feb. 1949),
" Ibid.
7 Ibid.
,Kostelanetz, op. cit. supra note 45, at 95.
"AsAMERICAN INSTITUTE OF ACCOUNT.ANTS, CODIFICATION OF STATEMENTS ON
AUDITING PROCEDURE 18 (1951).
"The presentation of financial statements on the stationery or in a report of an
independent certified public accountant without a definitive expression clearly indi-
cating the representations he is making as to their fairness tends to create uncertain-
ties in the minds of those who do not have special information regarding the prepar-
ation of the financial statements. In such cases, these third parties have no basis for
determining what inferences are warranted by the association of his name with the
financial statements and may place undue reliance upon them."
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Of course, the penalties, if any, which are likely to be imposed by a
professional body for violations of its code of ethics are less severe than
those which can be imposed in courts of law for causing financial damage to
others. If public accountants aspire to full professional status and a con-
tinuation of the high esteem in which they have been held by the business
community, it does not seem unreasonable to expect them to take full legal
responsibility for their own negligence, at least if that negligence seems
"gross" to a jury, instead of relying entirely upon the internal self-policing
of the profession under its code of ethics. After all, the very purpose of the
public accountant in preparing and certifying a financial statement is to
engender trust and confidence in that statement on the part of large num-
bers of "third persons." It hardly seems fair to exonerate him from lia-
bility to such third persons when he is successful in this aim. In any law-
suit against the accountant for either fraud or negligence, the third party, of
course, must always prove a causal connection between the accountant's
misrepresentation and the ensuing loss, -but if he can do this, he should, in
all good conscience, recover damages. As one legal writer has said, "A
profession should not be permitted to reap the benefits of a position of
trust and confidence without assuming the responsibilities which should
rightfully accompany it."50
In practice, where there is substantial uniformity of opinion within a
profession as to what constitutes reasonable and ethical conduct in the prac-
tice of that profession, a properly instructed jury, or a judge trying the facts
where a jury trial has been waived, is not too likely to hold members of
that profession to a higher standard of care. There was, after all, conflicting
expert testimony in the Ultramares case; the accountants won the Beardsley
and O'Connor cases; and the reason for the loss of the State Street Trust
Company case by Ernst and Ernst may well have been, to a large extent, that
they did not deign to offer expert testimony contradicting that of the plain-
tiff's experts.
THE SECURITIES Acr OF 1933
It will be recalled that Cardozo, in his Ultramares opinion, had said that
if public accountants were to be made liable to third parties for ordinary
negligence as well as for fraud, this would be a change so revolutionary that
"Since the independent certified public accountant cannot effectively control the
use to which financial statements accompanied by his name be put, the adoption of
practices which will minimize the possibilities of uncertainties and misinterpretations
by third parties is obviously in the interest of all concerned and should aid in the
avoidance of embarrassment and damage to the profession."
' Anon., The Accountant's Liability-for What and to Whom, 36 IOWA LAW RH-
VIEW 319, 326-327 (1950).
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it would have to be wrought by legislation and not by a mere court de-
cision.5 ' In the limited sphere in which it operates, Section 11 of the
Federal Securities Act of 1933, as amended,52 effects this change. Indeed,
in certain respects it goes even further.
The third parties protected -by the Securities Act are the purchasers of
securities which are offered for sale to the public through the mails or in
interstate commerce. Creditors other than bondholders are not protected.
Before such an offer is made, the Act requires53 that a so-called "registration
statement" be filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission. This
registration statement must include balance sheets and profit and loss
statements of the company issuing the securities, both certified by an inde-
pendent public or certified accountant, and both, ordinarily, as of a date not
more than 90 days prior to the filing of the registration statement.
54
In order to recover damages from the public accountant, the purchaser
of the securities need prove only that the registration statement, at the
time it became effective, contained an untrue statement of a material fact
or a misleading omission of a material fact, unless the defendant can prove
that at the time of the purchase the purchaser knew of such untruth or
omission. The purchaser does not even have to prove that he relied upon
the registration statement, unless he acquired the security after the issuer
had published an earnings statement covering at least one year after the
effective date of the registration statement. And even then he does not
have to show that he actually read the registration statement.5  In these
respects it is easier for the third party to recover damages under the Se-
curities Act than in a common-law action.
The accountant, however, cannot be sued under this statute unless he
has given his consent to be named as having prepared or certified some
part of the registration statement or some reporter used in connection there-
with. Furthermore, he is not liable for damages if he sustains the burden
of proof that he had, after reasonable investigation, a reasonable belief that
his representations in the registration statement were true and not mis-
leading. But he must have had this belief not merely as of the date of the
financial statements, but as of the later date when the registration statement
of which they formed a part became effective. Finally, if the accountant can
Id. at 322.
-48 STAT. 74 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77K (1952).
The language in which statutes are drawn does not often make for ease of com-
prehension. The ones under consideration here are no exception. Therefore, in the
interest of lucidity, they will be described and paraphrased rather than quoted di-
rectly.
"48 STAT. 78, 88, 91 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77(f), (g) and (aa) (25), (26),
(27) (1952).
- 48 STAT. 82 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77(K) (a) (4) (1952).
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prove that the plaintiff's losses resulted in whole or in part from causes other
than false statements or misleading omissions in the financial statements, he
may escape liability or reduce the amount of damages.56
The net effect of these provisions would seem to be that the public ac-
countant is still not liable to the third party if he can show compliance with
generally accepted auditing standards and can, in addition, sustain the bur-
den of proof which the statute shifts to him with respect to certain matters
such as the lack of a causal connection between his work and the plaintiff's
injury. Surprisingly enough, there has yet to be reported a court case
brought under this statute against an accountant, based on alleged false
statements or misleading omissions as of the date of a financial statement.57
THE SECURITES EXCHANGE AcT OF 1934 AND OTHER STATUTES
The Federal Securities Exchange Act of 193458 provides for the regula-
tion of stock exchanges and lays down certain requirements with respect to
the securities listed and traded on such exchanges, including annual reports
to the Securities and Exchange Commission containing financial statements
certified by independent public accountants. For present purposes, this
statute resembles the Securities, Act of 1933 in that third parties who are
given rights are the purchasers and sellers of securities, but recovery of
damages is more difficult under the 1934 Act in several respects.
The plaintiff must prove that the accountant's representation was
false or misleading with respect to some material fact at the time when it
was made and in the light of the circumstances then prevailing. This, of
course, is prior to the effective date of the report to the Commission, but
it is subsequent to the end of the accounting period. Thus, under both
statutes the accountant must consider developments after the end of the
accounting period. The plaintiff must also prove that he relied upon the
accountant's representation in buying or selling a security at a price which
was affected by such representation.
On one point, however, the 1934 Act follows the pattern of the 1933
Act, that is, in shifting the burden of proof to the defendant. The account-
ant may avoid liability if he can prove that he acted in good faith and had
no knowledge that his statement was false or misleading. Since he could
prove these things and still be negligent -by common-law standards, it has
been suggested that the 1934 Act, apart from its provisions as to the burden
- 48 STAT. 82 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77(K) (1952).
7 LEvY, AccouNTANTs' LEGAL REsPONSIBILITY 47 (New York: American Institute
of Accountants, 1954).
'48 STAT. 881 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1952).
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of proof, merely enacts the rule of the Ultramares case, under which the
accountant is liable to third parties only for fraud.59
The Federal Public Utility Holding Company Act of 193560 contains
provisions on accountants' liability similar to those of the 1934 Securities
Exchange Act.
One interesting aspect of all these Federal statutes is that the misstate-
ments and omissions for which they impose legal liability may be either
over-statements or understatements of a company's financial position. A
person who already owns stocks or bonds of the auditor's client, and is in-
duced to sell them at too low a price because the certified -balance sheet or
income statement contains material understatements, may recover damages
from the auditor.
The so-called "blue sky" laws of the various states do not specifically
affect the legal responsibilities of public accountants to third parties, al-
though some of them make it a felony, punishable by means of a crimi-
nal prosecution, for an accountant to make representations with actual
knowledge that they are false.61 For the most part, these laws merely
provide for the licensing of stock brokers and dealers and for inspection
of the securities by state authorities. The Florida statutes, however, pro-
vide that the same civil remedies provided by the federal securities laws
shall be available to purchasers of securities to which the Florida statutes
apply.62
THE SHONTS CASE
The only reported judicial decision on the liability of public account-
ants to third parties under the federal securities acts involved the trouble-
some issue of transactions and events occurring after the end of the account-
ing period. The case in question, Shonts v. Hirliman,6s was decided by the
United States District Court for the Southern District of California in 1939,
and was apparently never appealed.64 The plaintiffs were purchasers of
stock in Condor Pictures, Incorporated, and the defendants were the mem-
bers of the auditing firm of Webster, Atz and Company.
The plaintiffs alleged that the registration statement of Condor Pictures
BLEvy, AccouNTANTs' LEGAL RESPONsIBILITY 50 (1954). See note 57 supra
for publication information.
49 STAT. 838 (1935), 15 U.S.C. § 79 (1952).
LEvY, AccOuNTANTs' LEGAL RESPONSIBILITY 50 (1954). See note 57 supra
for publication information.
6 ibid.
'28 F. Supp. 478 (S.D. Cal. 1939).
Rappaport, Accountants' Responsibility for Events Occurring after the Statement
Date: the Shoots Case, JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTANCY, March 1953, p. 332, 334.
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was false and misleading in that neither it nor an amendment to it revealed
the existence of a lease obligating Condor Pictures to use the premises of a
certain studio for at least 100 days during the year at a minimum rental of
$35,000.05 Actually Condor Pictures did not become bound by this leasing
arrangement until January 31, twelve days after Webster, Atz and Company
had issued their certificate, so that at the time the certificate was signed it
contained no misstatements or omissions. Nevertheless the plaintiffs, re-
lying upon the provision in the Securities Act of 1933 imposing liability
for misstatements or omissions existing at the time the registration state-
ment becomes effective, sought to hold the auditors liable because the leas-
ing arrangement was not set up on the books of Condor Pictures as a con-
tingent liability.
In seeming disregard of the language of the statute, the court held for
the accountants and dismissed the case against them, stating that:
The rental arrangement was not called to their attention. There was
no entry on the books at their disposal from which, by further inquiry,
they might have discovered that there was such an undertaking. Absent
these, they cannot be charged with a misrepresentation which was made
later- long after their certification."
One authority, writing of the Shonts case, says:
If the surprisingly low accounting standards which seemed to satisfy
the court in this case are followed as the norm required by Section 11,
that section will turn out not to have advanced far beyond the "gross neg-
legence" standard which the New York court was willing to apply even
at common law. The fact is that the district court set a standard of care
far below that which is customary for the profession and necessary for the
detection of possible contingent liabilities to be listed in the registration
statement. Few reputable accounting firms would be satisfied with a mere
perusal of matters coming to their attention through inspection of the
"books at their disposal."'
Writers in the accounting journals 6s have cautioned their readers
about placing too much reliance on the Shonts case and have conjectured
upon the measures that an auditor should take to avoid liability for hap-
penings between the financial statement date and the effective date of
the registration statement. It seems to be agreed that there will be no
liability if the auditor stays in touch with the financial affairs of his
client during this interval by reading the minutes of shareholder, director
' Ibid. The amendment was dated February 1, 1937, but was declared by the S.E.C.
to be effective as of January 19, 1937, the date of the auditor's certificate.
28 F. Supp. 478, 483 (S.D. Cal. 1939).
"Loss, SEc=UTiEs REGULATION 1020 (1951).
'Powell, Procedures the Auditor Should Carry Out to Determine Events after State-
ment Date, JOURNAL oF ACCOUNTANcY, June 1953, p. 709; Rappaport, op. cit.
capra, note 64.
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and committee meetings, inspecting internal financial statements pre-
pared by the client, interviewing responsible officials of the client and
taking other measures short of a continued audit.6"
The Shonts case, of course, merely scratched the surface of the prob-
lems of construction residing in the civil liability sections of the federal
securities acts.
Powell, op. cit. supra, note 68.
